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8TATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from orders of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, granting defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment.

This court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) .
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Defendants Resource Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy
Hoagland submit that the following issues are before this court
on appeal:
1.

Whether this court should strike all or some of the

appeal and impose sanctions for Maacks' complete failure to
comply with Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P.

Fackrell v. Fackrell,

740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987).
2.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks

failed to present evidence supporting the essential elements of a
negligence claim and defendants were entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district c o u r t s
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State

Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770
P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
245, 247 (Utah 1988).

1

3.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that, in the

absence of a viable negligence claim, Maacks' res

ipsa

loquitur

claim also failed as a matter of law.
Standard of Review;

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247.
4.

Whether the district court never reached Maacks' Motion

For Summary Judgment on res

ipsa

loquitur,

precluding any

appellate review of Maacks' claim that they are entitled to
application that doctrine.
5.

Whether, even assuming Maacks are entitled to a ruling

on the applicability of res

ipsa

loquitur,

they have failed to

cite undisputed facts in the record establishing the required
elements as a matter of law.
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247.
6.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks

failed to present evidence supporting the required elements of a
strict liability claim and defendants were entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

2

Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245f 247.
7.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed Maacks'

implied warranty of habitability claim on the basis that Utah has
not adopted such a warranty in the sale of residential property.
Standard of Review:

In reviewing an order of

dismissal, this court will take the factual allegations
of the Complaint as true and consider them and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d

668, 669 (Utah 1989).

The district court's conclusions

of law are reviewed for correctness.
8.

Whether, even assuming Utah were to adopt an implied

warranty of habitability in the sale of residential property,
Maacks' claim was properly dismissed because defendants were not
builder/vendors.
Standard of Review:

In reviewing an order of

dismissal, this court will take the factual allegations
of the Complaint as true and consider them and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.

Lowe, 779 P.2d 668, 669.

The district

court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness.
3

9.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks

failed to present evidence supporting the required elements of a
claim for negligent misrepresentation and defendants were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district courts
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State. 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247.
10.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks

failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting a
claim for intentional misrepresentation.

Kohler v. Garden City.

639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981).
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247.

11.

Whether Maacks' failure to exercise reasonable,

ordinary diligence, which would have prevented all alleged
damages, precluded their misrepresentation claims.
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247.
4

12.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that based

on the undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise reasonable
ordinary diligence as a matter of law.
Standard of Review:

This court will analyze the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness.

Copper State, 770

P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247.
13.

Whether Maacks' appeal of the district court's denial

of their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on Resource Design's
Counterclaim is moot, as a result of the dismissal of the
Counterclaim, and, therefore, not properly subject to appellate
review.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P., which states in pertinent
part:
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain
contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on.
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P., which states in pertinent
part:
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted . . . .
Rule 56(c),(e), Utah R. Civ. P., which state in pertinent
part:

5

The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein . . . . When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees Resource Design and Timothy Hoagland supply the
following Statement of the Case because the Statement provided by
Appellants Robert and Judith Maack is incomplete, incorrect, and
largely unsupported by the record.
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is a case brought by purchasers of a home (Robert and
Judith Maack) against both the original owner/seller (Dr. Robert
Jarvik) and the contract builder (Resource Design & Construction,
Inc. and its president, Timothy Hoagland) to recover damages for
alleged defects in the home.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

On or about June 1, 1990, plaintiffs/appellants Robert Maack
and Judith Maack ("Maacks") filed a Complaint against Resource
6

Design & Construction, Inc

("Resource Design") and its

president, Timothy Hoagland ("Mr, Hoagland"
a l l e q i if

"' I1,,,,,,,""

II ,,,

I

I, „ I i ,„„ InJkif.f

„ I

Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland.
negligent "design

I

The Complaint
I "I

„,h„.f

It contained claims for

construction," "breach of warranty," and

"neg 1 i gen I MI I i
demanded compensatory damages for "diminished value" in the
amount of $250,000 and punitive damages in the amount « :
$:i 00. 0C 3

I !: - , I 2 5

Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland subsequently filed an
Answer and Resource Design filed a Counterclaim against Maacks
coi ita i i li i lg ::::,] ai lis fi

breach

oi I tr ac t, I n lji is t: • = .i lr i ::1: lmei l t: ai :t ::i

conversion relating t ::• certain work Resource Design performed at
Maacks' request after Maacks purchased the home.

Resource Design

demanded compensatory damages
at 8-20.

Resource Design

**.

Hoagland filed

: ihira Parry

Complaint against D r . Jarvik for the purpose of apportioning
rauu

DT imp]

and including a claim
After Jarvik

defendan

joined J

Maacks filed

relat i m
consolidate t h e

defendants as i ri::r;i party

separate lawsuit against Jarvik

irehase
* cases.

* i i

,,

J!)(

MI nil-, , riiii'iii iii .• i • 11 I 11

t 230.

Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland subsequent! y fi led a Motion
To Dismiss the implied warranty and misrepresentation claims
asserted by Maacks,
Dismiss IIIII

J? District Court granted the Motion
<

to attempt to
;

replead their misrepresentation claim in an amended complaint. R.
at 548 (a copy of the Order is attached as Ex. A to Maacks/
Addendum).

The court also consolidated the two separate laws its

filed by Maacks. Id.

Maacks filed their First Amended Complaint

on November 4, 1991. R. at 304 (a copy is included in the
Addendum hereto as Ex. "A").
Maacks filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the
breach of contract claim asserted in Resource Design,s
Counterclaim.

R. at 1121.

The District Court denied the Motion

For Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that material issues
of fact remained for trial.

R. at 2286 (a copy of the Order is

attached as Ex. B to Maacks7 Addendum).
On March 25, 1992, defendants Resource Design and Mr.
Hoagland filed their Motion For Summary Judgment. R. at 1428.
Defendant Dr. Jarvik also filed his Motion For Summary Judgment
on Maacks' claims at the same time.

R. at 1616.

On March 31, 1992, Maacks filed a Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment On The Issue of Res Ipsa Loquitur. R. at 1740.
Hearings on the motions for summary judgment filed by
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland and Dr. Jarvik were held on May
6 and 7, 1992.

The District Court subsequently granted both

motions and entered judgments and Rule 52 statements on June 17,
1992.

R. at 2212 and 2140 (a copy of the Rule 52 Statement on

Resource Design's and Hoagland's Motion For Summary Judgment is
attached as Ex. E to Maacks' Addendum, that for Jarvik7s Motion
is attached as Ex. D to Maacks' Addendum).
8

The court never ruled

on Maacks/ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment ^r The Issue Of
Res Ipsa Loquitur because it granted defendants' Motion For

Pursuant
22C

< :

:. anopposed Motion of Resource Design (R. *"*•

*:he District

:e Order ,

urt dismissed Resource Desigr

Judgment

r Dismissal is included in the

Addendum hereto as Ex
C.

Statement of Facts,

1.

Response to Maacks' Statement of Facts

the Motion For Summary Judgment filed

;

~

opposing

Resource Design and Mr.

1 loag] ai 1 :i

:

deposition testimony M required by Rule
R. at 1970-89

ta

. See,

appeal, they attempt to support their

"Statement of Facts1'

. "ing to material which i>, '.•imply mil in

the record and which was never provided to

r

he District Court for

review in deciding the Motion For Summary Judgment.The entire . ::st paragrapt

Maacks

taUjnujnt nl huts ,"

consists only ot unsupported allegations, not facts which were
before the court.

Maacks7 Brief ;

Paragraph 2 incorrectly stat

•- :

general contractor who built Jarvik's house

Hoagland was
Maacks' Brier,

- Where depositions are not provided to the trial court and made part of
the record, the facts contained therein are not legally before the appellate
court in reviewing summary judgment. In this case, only those undisputed
facts presented by Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were actually supported by
affidavits and deposition excerpts in the record. This court can therefore
disregard Maacks' "Statement of Facts." See, Conder v. A.L. Williams &
Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987).

9

7.

Although it is of doubtful relevance, the statement is

incorrect.

The affidavits of both Dr. Jarvik and Mr. Hoagland

establish that all parties to the contract understood that
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. was performing as the
general contractor and Mr. Hoagland was merely a representative
of that company.

R. at 1513-16, 1522-25.

Paragraph 3 is unsupported by evidence in the record.

The

deposition transcripts to which Maacks cite were never provided
to the District Court.

The citations to the record are primarily

citations to unsupported statements in Maacks7 own Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.

See. Maacks Brief, pp. 7-9, n.s

19-23.
In paragraph 4, Maacks allege that they were told about a
"builders warranty" prior to executing the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement. Maacks Brief, pp. 9-10.

This was disputed.

Maclyn

Kesselring stated in her affidavit that she did not mention a
"builders warranty" until after Maacks had signed the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement.

R. at 1841. Maacks repeatedly reference

"defects" in the home without citing any competent evidence in
the record establishing the existence of any "defects." See,
Maacks' Brief, pp. 9-13.

Dr. Jarvik's Deposition, to which

Maacks repeatedly cite was never provided to the court or made
part of the record.
2.

Resource Design's and Mr. Hoagland's Statement of

Material Undisputed Facts.

In support of their Motion For

Summary Judgment, Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland provided the
10

District Court with affidavits and excerpts from deposition
testimony.

Those materials are part of the record.

See, R. <it

i were i i

»m

the pleadings, 1nterrogatories, affidavits ^na depositions in t h e
record.
1 .

Il I ' d I II Ill, I l l

RCSOHII i V

|1'€»S J r u n

I,,

'

'

("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporatic ;
since approximate! y 1 979

"

. . standing

se e , Hoagland Affidavit, f 2, I t. at

Resour ze De si gi i :i

1 5] I

"'

t:l: I =

i

contracting, primarily :i i I the areas of custom residential homes
and light commercial buildings.
ie]i: i :> J t: J • : i
2.

It

j: 1 5: 3 1 0

See, Hoagland December 3, 19 91
I: Il 19 3 .

From 1986 to the present, defendant Timothy Hoagland

has been a shareholder ai id president of Resource Design.
Hoagi -

k if: I : \ i <l,i"

3.

i I „, 'f|| " „,

!

Il

! '". Il II

In early 1986 Pr, Robert Jarvik (defendant and third-

party defendant) approached Resource Design
bin Lull hi in cii personal residence
City.

See.

S e e . Jarvik Affidavit
4.

;

request that It

it -ll'ii IJIiii!

:e

1 ,! , R. at l1.

D r . Jarvik subsequently contacted a professional house

i J e s 111 m > i

i e c u mullein j (

" "' •

"'

11 i i

I nes i ijii,

Dr

J an : i I :: p i : • = = =ii i te< I

hi s c: wn drawings or *-:.r house he wanted to bui Id t :> the house
designer w h o then assisted Jar^
.,ztidavi

Jarvi
5.

t , f 3

I

preparing the plans.

See,

t I : 1! 523

On or about Jul > 1 , 198 6, Resource Design entered a

standard f ::: r in agreement between owner and contractor with Dr.

Jarvik to construct a home for Jarvik.

See, Hoagland Affidavit,

5 3, R. at 1514. When he signed the agreement, Dr. Jarvik
understood that Tim Hoagland was signing it in his capacit

as a

representative of Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ar

not in

a personal capacity.
6.

See, Jarvik Affidavit, I 4, R. at

J23.

Dr. Jarvik understood that, in all his dealings with

Tim Hoagland, Mr. Hoagland was acting as a representative of
Resource Design & Construction, Inc.

Dr. Jarvik never believed

he was dealing with Tim Hoagland in Mr. Hoagland's personal or
individual capacity.
7•

See, Jarvik Affidavit, I 5, R. at 1523-24.

Resource Design completed construction of Jarvik's home

one year later, in the beginning of July, 1987.
Affidavit, 5 5.

R. at 1514.

See, Hoagland

Dr. Jarvik was very satisfied with

the work done by Resource Design and believed the completed house
was beautiful.
8.

See, Jarvik Affidavit, 5 6, R. at 1524.

Due to a job change, Dr. Jarvik moved from Salt Lake

City to New York City in the summer of 1987. He consequently
listed the completed home for sale.

See, Jarvik Affidavit, 5 7,

R. at 1524.
9.

Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live in the home

through the winter of 1987-1988 and subsequently rented the home
for a short period of time in the summer of 1988.

See, Jarvik

Affidavit, 5 8, R. at 1524.
10.

At the end of July, 1988, plaintiffs Robert and Judith

Maack contacted the listing agent on Jarvik's home and, after
looking at the house, entered into a Earnest Money Sales
12

Agreement for the fill 1 asking price of $ 595,000.00

The Sales

Agreement specified that plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as
conditi on.
Affidavit, \

S e e, Jarvik

L U I plaintiffs executed the

Agreement (Ex, H to Maacks' Addendum, R at ] 54 0-4 3) they first
ii in I

I Ii

I iii in

t ;\f R = . s :: i iree Design &

Construction, Inc. See, Judith Maack December
deposition

t

a

1QQ1

198.

11. ™>
purchase contingent upo
Maack Affidavit

See,

satisfactory inspection repori.
759-61; Agreement,

I he

real estate agent that

builders warranty existec

requested written confirmation of surh

~> . iC ver

varrant^ ^r _*„ details.

See: r | faaek
12.

None of :T.<> alleged defects i i I the home were latent.

They al 1 won] d '"i *v*> been discovered toy a reasonable inspection at
1 III!

I mi iiiiiE I laac: J :s

=

I la; ::i I:::l I

i

inspection prior to committing to purchase the home "as ~" *~}rr
Maacks would have avoided
Mdri- » •

Aj.l

of their alleged damages. S e e ,

Il , I 1 in I I
I
I ».

•

Plaintiffs' first contact with Resource Design or Tim
Hoagland came
1

- about August in, I^HR, when Mr. Hoagland sent

. •

in i mi |

1 1 1

Construction, Inc." conveying information
the home.

the alarm system for

See, Hoag 1 and Affidavit, \ u, x\. ac 1514-15. M r .
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Hoagland never represented to plaintiffs in any of his
communications with them that he was acting in any capacity other
than as a representative of Resource Design.

See. Hoagland

Affidavit, 5 7, R. at 1515.
14.

After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs

asked Resource Design to perform certain construction work on
their home.

See. Hoagland Affidavit, 5 8, R. at 1515.

Prior to

completion of the work, the Maacks never indicated to Resource
Design that they did not intend to pay for the work.
Hoagland Affidavit, R. at 1320.

See,

After Resource Design performed

substantial work on plaintiffs' home and submitted a bill,
plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done.

See, Robert Maack

deposition, pp. 285-286, R. at 1504; Hoagland Affidavit, 5 9, R.
at 1515.
15.

After Resource Design stopped performing work for the

Maacks, the Maacks waited over one and a half years before
engaging another contractor to work on the home.

R. at 1511 and

1515.
16.

On or about June 6, 1990 Maacks filed this lawsuit

against Resource Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland
for breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, and
misrepresentation.

See. Complaint, R. at 2.
8UMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Maacks' Brief contains eight numbered arguments relating to
their claims against Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland.

Six of

these arguments, however, fail to cite evidence in the record
14

supporting their claims as required by Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R.
App

:

remaining arguments are directed towards the
»"

court

«ey i.-e obviously moot

ml i s u n mi

.oil

Il I 1 , 1

I 11

I ni 'i I ni 1 i I

these grounds, this court

may decline review of all eiqht arguments,
I ' I ||ll III I ' ,11

|,

II II III

III II l,!!1

-z should nonetheless affirm the district court.' • Summary

Brief
Judgment

*>**•*• of Maacks7 claims.
a

facie case or negligence.
judgment

-

?r.r

While this court can affirm summary

+ >,;** finds support

i.. •

I .1 1. i I

-**'=> "ecord,

•. -

i

that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland owed a duty to Maacks to
protect them from economic loss.
Maack ' res ipsa

loquitur

claim f ^

as the underlying negligence claim.

Accordingly, the district

court never ml'"1 1 « n Maacks7 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Issue ol HHIJ Ipsa Loquitur and there i s no appealable
order on this issue.

Even assuming the negligence claim were

viable, Maacks have failed to present sufficient competent
evidence to establish a J II I
l l.liu elements necessary I
application of res

ipsa

loquitur

upput I:

and the facts they did present

were directly disputed.
Maacks have failed t^ present any evidence supporting the
requisite elements of a strict liability claim.

Resource Design

and Mr. Hoagland were not sellers of a product in an unreasonably
dangerous condition which caused physical harm.
Maacks' implied warranty of habitability claim was properly
dismissed because Utah has not adopted an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of residential property.

Even in states

which have adopted such a warranty, the allegations of the
Complaint in this case did not satisfy the elements required of
such a claim.
Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence the record
supporting the elements of an intentional or negligent
misrepresentation claim.

In addition, their own failure to

exercise reasonable, ordinary diligence precludes their
misrepresentation claims.
The district court correctly ruled that, based on the
undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise reasonable, ordinary
diligence which, by Maacks' own admission, would have prevented
all their alleged damages.
For these reasons the district court's Summary Judgment and
Order of dismissal should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Maacks' Brief on appeal includes eight arguments directed
towards Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland.

Of these eight

arguments, six should be disregarded or stricken for failure to
comply with Rule 24, Utah R. App. P.

Rule 24(a)(9) provides that

the brief of the appellant "shall contain the contentions and
16

reasons of the appellant wi th respect to the issues presented,
with citations to + *• authorities, statutes and parts of the
record relied on,"

i

: "Briefs which are i iot in

compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer."
In Demetropolous v. Vreeken. 754 P.2d 960, 961 (Utah App.
1988), the Court of Appeals stated:
Counsel should be aware that appellate courts
beginning to overcome their trepidation about
dismissing appeals and imposing sanctions for failure
to comply with these procedures. For example in
KushnerTv. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co.. 620 F.2d 404, 407
(3d Cir. 1980)], while acknowledging the
' institutional' and 'precedential' impact of its
decision, found that counsel's 'refusal, failure or
unwillingness to master (the court's) procedures'
necessarily required dismissal of the appeal and
imposition of sanctions for failure to file an appendix
in conformity with court rules. Id. at 407. More
recently, this court chose to disregard an inadequa
brief and premised its affirmance, in part, on the
failure of the brief to comply with our rules. Koulis
v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P-2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App.
1987) .
"»sei \\\ i ./ , 'n.

Consistent w. .

.4-w .jurt of Appeal£

also declined

address the merits of an appeal where the

appellant's brief * -; - - - *

JS

ontain citations t n t he record. See
11'|"" l| I '''": 'es

Fackrell v. Fackrell
i iot provide adequate citations •

"he recc-xt

lower court is presumed to be correct:. '

* r.i judgment of the
at x->i8.

The requirement that arguments on appeal contain speei f:i • ::::
c i t a t i o n s t o t h e r e c o r d i .:> p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t w h e r e , as h e r e ,
appellant must

point to specific evidence in the record which supports the
elements of his/her claims.

Bare allegations, unsupported by any

facts, are not sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1990).

Mas jey

Maacks

have completely failed to meet this requirement.
Point I of Maacks' argument, relating to summary judgment on
their negligence claim, does not contain even a single citation
to the record.
ipsa

loquitur,

Point II, relating to summary judgment on res
contains only one citation to the record.

Brief, p. 23, n. 54.

Maacks'

Point III, relating to summary judgment on

strict liability, again contains not one single citation to the
record.

Point IV, relating to dismissal of Maacks' implied

warranty claim, contains no citations to the record.

Point V,

relating to summary judgment on Maacks7 misrepresentation claim
is the same - there are no citations to the record, only bare
allegations.

Point VI, again directed toward the summary

judgment, contains one sole citation to the court's Rule 52
statement.

There are no citations to evidence in the record

supporting Maacks' argument under Point VI.2' Maacks' complete
failure to cite to the record in their argument warrant
affirmance of the district court's summary judgment and the
imposition of sanctions under Rule 24(k) Utah R. App. P.
Even if this court were to reach the merits of Maacks'
appeal, the district court's order of dismissal and summary
- As explained in Point VII of this Brief of Appellees, infra, the
remaining Points VII and VIII of Maacks' argument are moot and not subject to
review on appeal.
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judgment should nonetheless be affirmed for the reasons set forth
in I-tie following points ~:f argument submitted by appellees
R e s i ji hi i H

L i e s I IJII

(iiiiiiii I '"!"
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MAACKS'
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Under Point 1 of their Brief, Maacks appear to be arguing
that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment
dismissing their negligence claim,

Maacks# argumei

,

reads more like an argument in opposition r ; a motion to dismiss
under ] 2(b)(6)

Utah R. Civ. P

11:1 Celotex v. Catrett, 47 ; ; J s

3ill ; :

:Iie \\ 11 • 11

States Supreme Court defined the burden on a party opposing
\udgment:

summa

There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact,
since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law because the non-moving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect: to which she has the burden of proof. The
standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule ::>£
Civil Procedure 50(a) . . . .
To establish a prima facie case of i legligence the plaint, it I in1 st
show:
(1) a duty of reasonable ^ a u ~*cu L : ... defendant to
the plaintiff; (2) breach of that dut\; ; ) the
causation, both actually and proximately, of injury;
and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff.
Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

While Resource Design's Motion For Summary Judgment on the
negligence claim was primarily based on the lack of the duty and
breach of duty elements, Maacks' Brief completely fails to meet
the burden of proof concerning the all essential elements of
their negligence claim.

It contains not a single citation to any

evidence in the record which they claim supports their negligence
claim.

Maacks' Brief, pp. 5-8.

The First Claim for Relief in Maacks' First Amended
Complaint alleged that the Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were
negligent in failing "to properly design, supervise, construct,
warn and inspect the construction" the home Maacks purchased from
Dr. Jarvik.

Maacks alleged they are entitled to recover damages

in excess of $250,000.00 for the "cost of repair" to the home and
"the diminished use and enjoyment of their home."

See, First

Amended Complaint, R. at 304.-7 Maacks did not claim any
personal injury.

See, R. at 1503. Maacks' claims are clearly for

economic loss.
Economic loss has been defined as:
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair
and replacement of the defective product, or
consequent loss of profits without any claim
of personal injury or damage to other
property . . . as well as the diminution in
the value of the product because it is

- In his deposition, plaintiff Mr. Maack was asked to identify any
property damage allegedly resulting from defendants' acts or omissions.
The
only property damage Mr. Maack identified was negligible water damage to a few
books (which plaintiffs do not care about replacing), the cost of cleaning
some suits (no more than $50.00), the cost of cleaning some carpet and the
cost of replacing an allegedly water-damaged couch. See, Robert Maack depo.,
pp. 31-32 (R. at 1503). If Maacks wish to pursue claims for these damages,
they should do so in small claims court.
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inferior in quality and does not work for the
general purpose for which it was manufactured
and sold.
2314 Lincoln Park West Condo. v. Mann. 555 N.E.2d 346, 348 (111.
1990).
Like the overwhelming majority of states, Utah recognizes
the distinction the law has drawn between tort and contract law
embodied in the "economic loss rule." In Wadsworth Construction
v. Salt Lake County. 818 P.2d 600 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works project in Salt
Lake County and brought suit against Salt Lake County for damages
on contract and negligence theories.

The trial court awarded

plaintiff damages for lost profits on a motion for summary
judgment and the county appealed.

The Utah Court of Appeals

reversed and remanded stating:
"We adopt the majority approach and hold that
damages for lost profits are not recoverable
under a negligence theory as a matter of Utah
Common Law."
Id. at 602.
The economic loss rule marks the fundamental boundary
between tort and contract law.

Contract law is designed to

enforce expectancy interests created through an agreement between
private parties.

Tort law, in contrast, seeks to protect

citizens and their property from physical harm by imposing a duty
to exercise reasonable care.

See, Sacramento Regional Transit

District v. Flexible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736,
739 (1984).

In short, the economic loss rule holds that one may
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not recover "economic" losses under the theory of non-intentional
tort.
Traditionally, interests which have been
deemed entitled to protection in negligence
have been related to safety or freedom from
physical harm • . . However, where mere
deterioration or loss of bargain is claimed,
the concern is with a failure to meet some
standard of quality. The standard of quality
must be defined by reference to that which
the parties have agreed upon.
Crowder v. Vandendeale. 564 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Mo. 1989) [emphasis
added.]
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court applied the
economic loss rule in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc.. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).

In that case a set of $1.4

million steamship turbines disintegrated because the manufacturer
had installed certain key components backwards.

There was,

however, no damage to persons or property other than the turbines
themselves.

The ship owner brought suit against the manufacturer

under the theories of contract, negligence and strict liability,
seeking to recover the cost to repair the turbines and lost
profits.

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the trial

court's order dismissing the negligence and strict liability
claims.
In East River, the Supreme Court determined that economic
loss is best "left entirely to the law of contracts."

It focused

on the need to keep tort and contract law in "separate spheres,
and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages."
871.

476 U.S. at

The Court specifically noted that the distinction made by
22

the economic loss rule is not actually based on the nature of the
injury, but rather focuses on the question of whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to guard against the
particular type of injury. Id.-7
A clear majority of states have recognized the economic loss
rule and applied it in construction cases similar to this one.
In Crowder v. Vandendeale, the Missouri Supreme Court considered
a case in which a subsequent purchaser of a home brought an
action against the contractor who built the house to recover
damages for the contractors alleged failure to construct the
house in a good, workmanlike manner.

The

Court held that the

"liability imposed for mere deterioration or loss of bargain
resulting from latent structural defects is contractual . . . "
and affirmed dismissal of the tort claims against the contractor.
Id. at 881.
The Arizona Court of Appeals considered a similar case in
which a subsequent purchaser of a home brought an action against
the builder alleging that latent defects in the construction had
caused severe damage to their home.
Inc., 690 P.2d 158 (Ariz. App. 1984).

Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes,
In Nastri the court held

that the subsequent purchaser of the home could not recover from
the builder on the theory of negligence.

The court stated that

where there was no claim for damage to personal property or

- Maacks now assert in their brief that Resource Design did not raise the
issue of duty, but only discussed economic loss in their original Memorandum
In Support of Summary Judgment. Maacks' Brief, p. 19. Apparently Maacks have
never understood that the economic loss rule focuses on the existence of a
duty.
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personal injury, the theory of negligence could not be used.
at 163.

The damage claimed involved the structure itself.

Id.

The

court relied on the holding in Crowder, concluding that recovery
for property damage caused by latent structural defects is not
actionable in negligence.
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf. 441 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1982) is a
case that is cited frequently for the proposition that a
plaintiff cannot recover solely economic losses in tort.
Redarowicz involves a subsequent purchaser who brought an action
to recover against a builder on the theories of contract, tort,
fraud, and implied warranty of habitability.

The complaint

alleged that the defendant builder was responsible for faulty
construction of the plaintiff's residence.

Soon after the

plaintiff purchased the house they discovered that the chimney
and adjoining brick wall were pulling away from the rest of the
house.

The court held that the subsequent purchaser's economic

losses consisting of the cost of replacement and repair of the
allegedly defective chimney, and adjoining wall and patio, were
not recoverable under the theory of negligence.

441 N.E.2d at

327.
The Redarowicz court stated that H[t]o recover in negligence
there must be a showing of harm above and beyond disappointed
expectations.

A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefits of his

bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects."
Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (citing Prosser, Torts § 92, at 613
[4th ed. 1971]).

In the present case, Maacks have shown no harm
24

"above and beyond disappointed expectations."

These disappointed

expectations have no place in tort law, but only in contract law.
In Colbera v. Rellinger. 770 P.2d 346 (Ariz. App. 1988), the
court held that a homeowner did not have a negligence claim
against the contractor for structural defects where the homeowner
did not allege any personal injuries or damage to property
already in existence.

Id. at 349.

The court cited Nastri, 690

P.2d 158, Crowderf 564 S.W.2d 879, and Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d
324, in making its conclusion.
In Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Com. Group, 745 P.2d 1284
(Wash. 1987), the members of the Board of Directors of a
condominium homeowners association brought suit for negligent
construction of decks and walkways on behalf of both original and
subsequent purchasers of condominium units.

Plaintiffs had not

suffered personal injuries or property damage.
recover the cost of repairs.

They sought to

Holding that a tort recovery was

an inappropriate remedy for the damages pleaded, the Washington
Supreme Court further explained:
Plaintiff homeowners faced with losses that
are not of their own making presents a
sympathetic case . . . . We must exercise
caution, however, that we do not unduly upset
the law upon which expectations are built and
business is conducted.
Id. at 1290; accord Atherton Condo. Bd. v. Blume Development, 799
P.2d 250, 262 (Wash. 1990).

In addition, the Washington Supreme

Court quoted Justice Traynor in the case of Seelv v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
Justice Traynor stated in Seely that:
25

The distinction that the law has drawn
between tort recovery for physical injuries
and warranty recovery for economic loss is
not arbitrary . . . The distinction rests . .
. on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake
in distributing his product. He can be
appropriately held liable for physical
injuries caused by the defects . . . He
cannot be held for the level of performance
of his products . . .
Id. at 1291.
Following Justice Traynor's distinction between tort and
contract law, the court in Stuart recognized that defects of
quality evidenced by internal deterioration, were in fact
economic losses.

The court decided that since the defects

concerned expectation interests, the appropriate set of rules
were in the area of contract law not tort law.

Id.

The court

also noted that the imposition of tort liability upon the
builder-vendor for economic loss would require them to become the
guarantors of the complete satisfaction of future purchasers with
whom they had absolutely no contract with.

Id. at 1292.

In addition to the above-mentioned cases, numerous others
have applied the economic loss rule in addressing tort claims in
the construction context.

See, e.g., Tusch Enterprises v.

Coffin. 740 P.2d 1022 (Idaho 1987) (purchaser of allegedly
defective residential duplexes could not recover economic losses,
including lost rental income and property damage, in negligence
action against vendors and builder); Washington Courte
Condominium v. Washington-Golf, 501 N.E.2d 1290 (111. App. 1st
Dist. 1986) (condo owners' alleged damages constituted solely of
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economic losses not recoverable in tort absent allegation of
damage to property or personal injury resulting from allegedly
defective plumbing fixtures); Atherton Condo. BD. v. Blume
Development. 799 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1990) (condo owners' alleged
construction defects constituted economic loss not recoverable in
tort law).
Maacks rely heavily on Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223
(Utah 1974).

This is surprising for a number of obvious reasons.

First, Good did not involve a claim by a subsequent purchaser.
Furthermore, it was decided on a statute of limitations.

The

court found that suit was barred by a statute limiting claims for
property damage, wrongful death or personal injury. Id. at 224.
There was no discussion at all regarding what type of damages
were alleged.
The language in Good at which Maacks grasp is simply dicta
and clearly presumes the existence of a contract and accidental
physical damage to property or personal injury.

Good does not

discuss liability of a contractor to subsequent purchasers for
economic loss.
The clear majority rule and the Utah rule is that no such
duty exists. -

Maacks attempt to ignore the majority rule

established in cases directly on point and instead try to get

~ Maacks argue that Good represents a majority position of allowing
subsequent purchasers to sue a contractor for economic loss and cite as their
authority a 1981 A.L.R. article. An inspection of the article cited by Maacks
reveals most, if not all, of the cases cited in that article relate only to
situations involving "spec builders" or builder/vendors. It is undisputed
that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were not spec builders or
builder/vendors in this case. They were merely contract builders.
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around the fatal lack of any contract with Resource Design or Mr.
Hoagland by mischaracterizing this case as a products liability
case.

In doing this they rely heavily on W.R.H.. Inc. v.

Economy Builders Supply. 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981).

That case,

however, is easily distinguishable on a number of grounds.
Most obviously, W.R.H. was an action commenced by the
purchaser of plywood siding against the retailer and manufacturer
of the siding.

Although W.R.H. does not apply strict liability,

it is clearly a products liability case predating the formal
adoption of strict liability in Hahn v. Armco Steel.

In

contrast, the present case involves a negligence claim by a
subsequent purchaser of the home against the contractor who built
the home on the original owner's property under a construction
contract with the original owner.

Maacks do not dispute that

there was never a contract between them and Mr. Hoagland and
Resource Design.
-

W.R.H. is inapposite.&

Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in W.R.H, is notable.

Justice Hall specifically dissented from that portion of the opinion
which held that the damages suffered by plaintiffs were recoverable on a
negligence theory. He stated:
The main opinion quotes Dean Prosser, but excerpts out the crucial
language. I agree with the general rule that liability for
negligence includes personal injury and damage to the chattel
itself. Prosser goes on, however, to state as follows:
But where there is no accident, and no physical
damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through
loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the
cost of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the
rule . . . that purely economic interests are not
entitled to protection against mere negligence, and so
have denied the recovery.
femphasis added.1 W.R.H. 633 P.2d at 47 (J. Hall dissenting) (quoting W.L.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, S 101 (4th Ed. 1971)). Justice Hall further
stated:
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In t h i s c a s e , the q u a l i t y of the work defendants were
o b l i g a t e d t o perform was defined and e s t a b l i s h e d by the
c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n t r a c t with Jarvik. R. at 1527.

That c o n t r a c t

a l s o provided for f i n a l acceptance of the work by the owner.
Jarvik was f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with defendants 7 work and accepted i t
accordingly.

See, Jarvik A f f i d a v i t ,

1 6, R. a t 1524.

Final

acceptance under t h e c o n t r a c t would be meaningless i f an e n d l e s s
stream of subsequent purchasers could sue Resource Design and Mr.
Hoagland a t any time in the future.

To accept Maacks' argument

would be t o s u b j e c t a l l custom contractors t o " l i a b i l i t y in an
indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time, t o an
indeterminate c l a s s . " Ultra-mares Corp. v. Touche. 174 N.E. 441,
444 (N.Y. 1931).

Such a burden on contract b u i l d e r s would be

unbearable.
Resource D e s i g n ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o build t h e house i n a
workmanlike manner e x i s t e d only because of t h e manifested i n t e n t
of the defendant (Resource Design) and the o r i g i n a l owner
(Jarvik).

No c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n ran t o t h e Maacks, who did

The main opinion seems t o accept the notion t h a t "purely economic
i n t e r e s t s " are not recoverable in t o r t , but goes on t o say that
d e t e r i o r a t i o n of a product i s properly t o be t r e a t e d as "property
damage."
The general r u l e i s that when the damage t o a product
r e s u l t s from d e t e r i o r a t i o n , internal breakage, or
other non-accidental causes, i t i s properly t o be
t r e a t e d as economic l o s s .
Id.
Since W.R.H. was decided in 1981, not one Utah case has followed it.
The sound analysis of Justice Hall's dissenting opinion, moreover, has since
been further recognized by the United States Supreme Court in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986) where it applied
the same reasoning as Justice Hall.
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not deal with Resource Design.

Accordingly, Maacks cannot sue

for the builder's failure to give them the benefit of the
bargain.
The instant case is undisputedly a case in which subsequent
purchasers of a home are attempting to recover economic loss from
the contract builder with whom they had no contract.

The current

Utah law, the clear majority of jurisdictions, and the United
States Supreme Court all recognize that under such circumstances
no cause of action in negligence exists.

The district court

correctly recognized that Maacks' attempts to hold Resource
Design and Mr. Hoagland to contractual duties under tort theories
is inappropriate.

In light of Maacks' failure to present any

evidence supporting the requisite elements of a negligence claim,
summary judgment was warranted and should be affirmed.
POINT II
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR SEEKING A RULING ON
APPEAL REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF RES
IPSA

LOQUITUR.

The "Third Claim for Relief" included in Maacks' First
Amended Complaint was for "declaratory judgment on applicability
of res

ipsa

loquitur."

R. at 309.

It appears that Maacks now

seek a ruling from this court that the doctrine of res
loquitur

applies to the instant case.

ipsa

Maacks' Brief, pp. 22-23.

It is well established that the doctrine of res

ipsa

loquitur

is merely an evidentiary doctrine "created to help plaintiff
establish a prima facie case of negligence using circumstantial
evidence."

Dallev v. Utah Vallev Regional Medical Center, 791
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P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990).

Although Maacks filed a separate

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment solely on the issue of the
applicability of the doctrine of res

ipsa

loquitur

(R. at 1740),

the trial court never reached the issue because it determined
that Maacks' underlying negligence claim failed as a matter of
law.

R. at 2216.

There is thus no final order of the trial

court to be appealed from on this issue.

The res

ipsa

loquitur

was dismissed for the same reason as the negligence claim.
Even if one were to assume Maacks could have a viable
negligence claim, they have again failed to cite any evidence in
the record which could support application of res
See.

Maacks' Brief, pp. 22-23.

ipsa

loquitur.

The single citation to the record

is to the Affidavit of Melvin Thompson which Maacks submitted in
support of their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue
of res

ipsa

loquitur.

Maacks' Brief, p. 23, n. 54. That

affidavit, however, is totally insufficient in several aspects.
First, Mr. Thompson's affidavit is merely a collection of
unsupported, vague, conclusory statements.

R. at 1771-73.

He

states that he has "extensive experience in the field of general
contracting as reflected in my deposition transcript." R. at
1772.

The deposition transcript is not in the record.

This

statement is wholly inadequate to establish foundation for expert
testimony.

Furthermore, Mr. Thompson's opinion is merely based

on the bare assertion that he has "inspected numerous defects in
the plaintiffs' home, most of which are detailed in my deposition
transcript."

Id.

Again this statement is wholly inadequate to
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establish the foundation necessary for an expert opinion for the
purpose of opposing or supporting summary judgment.
[A]ffidavits must include not only the expert's
opinion, but also the specific facts that logically
support the expert's conclusion . . . . [A] bare
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and
based his or her opinion on them will not suffice.
[emphasis added] Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah
1992) .
Under this court's standards for Rule 56(e) affidavits, Mr.
Thompson's affidavit is clearly inadequate.

Even if one were to

indulge Maacks and assume that Mr. Thompson's affidavit were
sufficient to support application of res

ipsa

loquitur,

it was

directly contradicted by the Affidavit of G. Brent Smith, which
Maacks, typically, have failed to even mention in their Brief.
R. at 1933-35.
The issue of the applicability of res

ipsa

loquitur

was

never addressed reached by the trial court and is consequently
not subject to appellate review.

Even if it were, however,

Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence in the record which
could suffice to defeat the summary judgment entered in favor of
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland.

Summary judgment on this issue

should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MAACKS'
STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM PAILS AS A MATTER OP
LAW.
The Second Claim for Relief included in Maacks' First
Amended Complaint purported to state a "strict liability" claim
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against defendants based upon alleged defects in the construction
of plaintiffs' residence.

R. at 3 06.

This claim is both

unsupported by evidence in the record and deficient on its face.
In Ernest W. Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel, 601 P.2d 152, 158
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the strict liability
doctrine expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah App. 1990).
§ 402A provides in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition
in which it is sold, (emphasis
added)•
Hahn. 601 P.2d at 156. (citing Restatement [Second] of Torts).
Thus, to support a claim for strict liability Maacks are first
required to submit evidence establishing that Resource Design and
Mr. Hoagland were sellers of a product.

Again, Maacks have

failed to include in their argument on this claim even a single
citation to evidence in the record supporting this element.

They

argue this issue as if it were decided on Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss, rather than summary judgment.

This is not surprising.

It was undisputed that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were
not "sellers".

Resource Design & Construction, Inc. is a
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corporation engaged in the general construction contracting
business and Mr. Hoagland is the president of the corporation.
R. at 304, 1493 and 1514.

Robert K. Jarvik submitted plans to

Resource Design for a custom home and subsequently contracted
with Resource Design to build the home, as his personal
residence, on real property he owned.
1523.

Jarvik Affidavit, R. at

One year after Resource Design completed the home, Maacks

purchased it from Dr. Jarvik.

Jarvik Affidavit, R. at 1524.

As the trial court correctly recognized, Resource Design and
Mr. Hoagland are not "spec" builders.

Resource Design merely

acted as general contractor under a contract with the owner, Dr.
Jarvik.

R. at 1514 and 1524.

In fact, there is not even an

allegation in the First Amended Complaint that the defendants
sold anything.

R. at 306-09.

Secondly, this case does not involve a "product."

It is

well established that most courts have refused to adopt the
contention that a building is a "product."

Papp v. Rocky

Mountain Oil and Minerals. 769 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Mont. 1989); and
see, e.g., Messier v. Ass'n of Apt. Owners, 735 P.2d 939 (Haw.
App. 1987); Charlton v. Dav Island Marina, Inc., 732 P.2d 1008
(Wash. 1987); McClahanan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp.
1334 (Dist. Colo. 1980); K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group of
Conn.. Ltd.. 489 F. Supp. 813 (Dist. Conn. 1980) . The minority
of states which have held that a home may constitute a product
for the purpose of strict liability have done so only under
certain, very specific circumstances.
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Papp, 769 P.2d at 1254.

These circumstances are limited to where the buildings or homes
are prefabricated and mass-produced, and the defendants are in
the business of selling these type of homes.

Id. at 1255; and

see, e.g., Shipper v. Levitt & Sons. Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J.
1965).

Clearly, this case does not present such circumstances.

Third, there is simply no evidence in the record, and Maacks
have cited none, that the home of which they complain was
"unreasonably dangerous."

This too is an essential element

without which their claim cannot survive.

Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156.

Fourth, as discussed under Point I of this Brief, the
present case is not one in which personal injury or property
damage are claimed.

By definition, strict liability applies only

where a defective product causes physical harm to a consumer or
his property.

Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156. As the United States

Supreme Court specifically held in East River, 476 U.S. 858, and
as a majority of states have recognized, the economic loss rule
applies equally to negligence and strict liability claims.
A case on point is Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes,
808 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1990).

In Waggoner, mobile home purchasers

brought an action against a manufacturer and dealer when their
mobile home suffered repeated problems with ceiling condensation
during the winter.

They sought the replacement cost of the home

under the theory of strict products liability.

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court cited the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in East River and stated:
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We adopt this reasoning and hold that in 7
Oklahoma no action lies in manufacturers
products liability for injury only to the
product itself resulting in purely economic
loss.
Waggoner. 808 P.2d at 653.

The court in Waggoner noted that the

facts of the case before it involved "only economic loss and
disappointment associated with the manufacturers unsuccessful
attempts to remedy condensation within consumers' mobile home."
Because no personal injury or damage to property other than the
product itself occurred, the court held that no recovery could be
had under strict liability. Id; see, also. Nobility Homes of
Texas, Inc. v. Shivers. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
Unlike Waggoner, the instant case does not involve a mobile
home, which can be considered a product.

Waggoner, however, is

helpful in demonstrating the proper application of strict
liability theory to this case if one were, for the sake of
argument, to assume the custom home built for Jarvik was a
product.

As Waggoner indicates, Maacks' strict liability claim

would fail even then because it is based on economic loss.
In their Brief, Maacks7 rely solely on Ernest W. Hahn v.
Armco Steel. 602 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), in support of their strict
liability claim.

Without even recognizing the requisite elements

of a strict liability claim, they mistakenly imply that this case
is indistinguishable from Hahn.
Contrary to Maacks7 assertion (Maacks7 Brief, p. 24), Hahn
did not discuss or recognize any recovery for economic loss. As
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in discussing economic
loss in Utah products liability law:
[I]ssues regarding the recovery of damages
were not before the court in Hahn. The
parties stipulated to the amount of damages,
and no specific charges were levelled against
the elements therein. Also we think it
unlikely that the court would decide such a
controversial issue without some discussion
of the matter.
James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1983).
Secondly, the court in Hahn specifically and expressly
adopted the strict liability doctrine and language of the
Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 402A, quoted above.
P.2d at 156.

Hahn, 601

Under the Restatement language adopted by the Utah

Supreme Court, the facts in Hahn warranted application of strict
liability.

The court noted that: the defendant (Armco Steel)

"mass-produced the joists and made the defective welds in its own
plant"; "sold the products in this case in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff"; "defendant engaged in the
business of selling such products"; and "these products caused
physical harm to plaintiff and his property."

Id. at 158.-'

These facts are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
The trial court correctly found that, based on the
undisputed facts, Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were entitled
to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.

Not only did Maacks fail

- Notably, the 1965 New Jersey case (Santor v. Karaqheusian, Inc., 207
A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) which plaintiffs claim is factually similar to the
instant case held that a manufacturer and seller of defective carpet was
liable to his purchaser for breach the implied warranty of reasonable fitness.
Santor did not involve claims against a contract builder under strict
liability.
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to allege sufficient facts to support a strict liability claim,
but they have completely failed to cite to evidence in the record
supporting any of the elements of such a claim.

Accordingly, the

trial courts ruling should affirmed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MAACKS'
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY.
A.
Utah has not adopted an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of residential property,
Maacks do not contend that Utah has recognized an implied
warranty of habitability running to purchasers of residential
housing•

Rather, they argue that Utah courts should now adopt an

implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential
property for the same reasons the court recently adopted such a
warranty for residential leases.

Maacks' Brief, pp. 26-3 0

(citing Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991)).

As the facts

of this case demonstrate, however, the circumstances with respect
to residential leases which this court has recognized as
supporting adoption of an implied warranty in leases, are clearly
not present in the purchase and sale of residential property.

A

lease transaction is vastly different from a sale.
In Wade v. Jobe. this Court noted that it has rejected
"strict application of traditional property law to residential
leases, recognizing that it is often more important to apply
contract law."

[emphasis added.] 818 P.2d at 1010. (citing Reid

v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 902, n. 3 (Utah
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1989)).

Consistent with this the Court rejected the rule of

caveat emptor in residential leases. Id.

It was the Courts

desire to compensate for the frequently poor bargaining position
of modern residential tenants which justified its adoption of the
implied warranty:
Modern tenants generally lack the necessary skills or
means to inspect the property effectively or to make
repairs. Moreover, the rule of caveat emptor assumes
an equal bargaining position between landlord and
tenant. Modern tenants, like consumers of goods,
however, frequently have no choice but to rely upon the
landlord to provide a habitable dwelling. Where they
exist, housing shortages, standardized leases, and
racial and class discrimination place today's tenants,
as consumers of housing, in a poor position to bargain
effectively for express warranties and covenants
requiring landlords to lease and maintain safe and
sanitary housing.
[citations omitted.] Wade, 818 P.2d at 1009.
The most obvious and important characteristic present in a
residential lease and absent in the sale of a house is the
ongoing contractual nature of the landlord/tenant relationship.
Residential tenants, are usually completely dependant on the
landlord for maintenance and repair of the residence throughout
the time of their occupation.

Purchasers, on the other hand, are

generally free to perform their own maintenance and repairs as
necessary - their relationship is not one of continuing
dependance or reliance.
The importance of this distinction is further highlighted
when one considers the unlimited liability that would result if
implied warranties were imposed on residential sellers.

By

nature of the landlord/tenant relationship, a tenant's cause of
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action for breach of an implied warranty of habitability must
arise during the term of the lease.

In contrast, if implied

warranties of habitability were imposed on a seller of a home, a
purchasers cause of action might not arise until 50, or more,
years after the sale of the home.

Sellers of homes would be

subjected to the specter of unlimited liability.
In addition, purchasers and sellers of residential real
estate are usually in equal bargaining positions.

Purchasers are

free to condition their offers to purchase on a satisfactory
physical inspection report by a licensed home inspector or
contractor, or upon express written warranties from the seller.
In fact, blank spaces for such conditions are specifically
provided in the form Earnest Money Sales Agreement approved by
the Utah Real Estate Commission and Utah Attorney General. See R.
at 1540-43.

As this case demonstrates, purchasers who exercise

due diligence are not in need of the special protection of far
reaching implied warranties.
Maacks offered the asking price of $595,000.00 to purchase
Dr. Jarvik's home.

R. at 1541. Maack, an experienced, and

obviously wealthy attorney, was in an equal, if not better,
bargaining position than Dr. Jarvik.

The Maacks' offer to

purchase, however, was not conditioned on any express warranties
or even on a satisfactory inspection report. R. at 1540-43 and
2214-15.

Certainly, a reasonable purchaser, especially one

paying over half a million dollars, would make use of the blank
spaces in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to condition his/her
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offer on a satisfactory inspection, the cost of which would be
negligible.
Maacks have admitted that a reasonable inspection at the
time of purchase would have revealed all the alleged defects in
the home and prevented all damages in this case.

Maacks7 Brief,

p. 10; Maack Affidavit, R. at 1761. Maacks clearly had the means
at their disposal to prevent all their alleged damages, yet, as
the trial court found, they failed to exercise ordinary
reasonable diligence.

R. at 2216-17. This type of situation

certainly does not support such an extreme measure as the
adoption of an implied warranty of habitability in the purchase
of a residence.

It is amazing that Maacks suggest it does.

B.
Even in those other states which have adopted an
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential
property, the trial court's dismissal of Maacks' claim would be
correct.
In those states which do recognize an implied warranty of
habitability and fitness, it is fundamental that the implied
warranty only arises from a contractual relation between the
builder/vendor of the home and the purchaser.

See Atherton

Condominium Apartment-Owners Association v. Blume Development
Co., 799 P.2d 250, 257-258 (Wash. 1990); Woodward v. Chirco
Construction Company. Inc., 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 1984);
Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964).

The two

prerequisites of the implied warranty of habitability are:
First the builder-vendor of the dwelling must
be a commercial builder. Second, the unit
must be built for sale, rather than personal
occupancy, [emphasis added].
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Atherton. 799 P.2d at 258, n. 7.

In the instant case the second

of these two prerequisites has not been met.
While Resource Design is a residential constructic \
contractor, it was not a "builder-vendor."

As Maacks alleged in

their First Claim For Relief, "defendants contracted co build and
construct a residential building."

See, Complaint p. 2, R. at 3.

Resource Design did not construct the subject home for sale and
Maacks did not allege otherwise. R. at 2-5.

It was undisputed

that Resource Design constructed the home under contract for the
owner, Dr. Robert Jarvik, who subsequently sold it to the Maacks.
R. at 1523-24.
Thus, the question of whether Utah should or should not
adopt implied warranties in the sale of residences need not be
decided in this case.

Even if Utah courts were to recognize a

cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of habitability
and fitness for residential property, the allegations of the
Complaint in this case failed to support such a claim.

The trial

court correctly dismissed Maacks claim for breach of implied
warranty of habitability.
POINT V
MAACKS HAVE FAILED TO CITE FACTS SHOWING A
MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT OR RELIANCE DAMAGES
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THEIR MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM.
Under Point V of their Brief, Maacks appear to be arguing
that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment
dismissing their claim for "negligent and/or intentional
misrepresentation."

Again, Maacks' argument, reads more like an
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argument in opposition to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6),
Utah R. Civ. P.

It contains no citations any evidence in the

record which they claim supports their misrepresentation claim.
In Price-Orem. Inc. v. Collins, Brown & Gunnel. 713 P.2d 55
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court described the elements of a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation as follows:
[T]he tort of negligent misrepresentation,
which provides that a party injured by
reasonable reliance upon a second party's
careless or negligent misrepresentation of a
material fact may recover damages resulting
from that injury when the second party had a
pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in
a superior position to know the material
facts, and should have reasonably foreseen
that the injured party was likely to rely
upon the fact, [emphasis added.]
Id. at 59 [citations omitted.]

See, also. Duaan v. Jones. 615

P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
Intentional misrepresentation, or fraud, requires that the
plaintiff, establish by clear and convincing evidence all of the
following elements:
1) that a representation was made; 2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; 3) which was false;
4) which the one making the representation either a)
knew to be false, or b) made recklessly knowing he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; 6) that the other party
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7)
did in fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to
act; 9) to his injury and damage.
Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981) (citing
Cheever v. Schramm. 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978)).
To warrant overturning the trial court's summary judgment on
Maacks' intentional misrepresentation claim, Maacks must now
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demonstrate that, in opposing summary judgment, they presented
evidence to the trial court which could establish by clear arci
convincing evidence all of the above elements.
even come close to meeting this burden.

They have no

As pointed out abo\*=s,

their argument contains no citations to the record.

Moreover,

the undisputed facts presented by Resource Design and Mr.
Hoagland affirmatively demonstrate the lack of the essential
elements to both intentional and negligent misrepresentation
claims.
Maacks based their "negligent and/or intentional
misrepresentation" claim on defendants' alleged statement that
they "would stand behind their product and make it right." See,
First Amended Complaint (Addendum, Ex. "A"); Plaintiffs7
Memorandum In Opposition (R. at 1985); Excerpt from Robert Maack
Depo. (R. at 1508-09).
Maacks7 allegation that Mr. Hoagland misrepresented that
Resource Design would "stand behind their work and make it right"
and "promised that they would correct the defects", is clearly,
at best, an allegation of an unenforceable promise.
misrepresentation of "material fact".

It is not a

The mere failure to

perform a promise will not support a claim for negligent or
intentional misrepresentation.

See, e.g., Cerritos Trucking Co.

v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982); Schow v.
Guardtone. Inc.. 19 Utah 2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966).
Resource Design acknowledges that, under some circumstances,
a statement of an intention to perform or not perform an act in
44

the future can support an action for fraud.

The required

circumstances, however, include that the party making the
statement did not intend to perform the act at the time he/she
promised it.

Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d

634, 638 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Berkeley Bank for Coops, v.
Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980)).

Thus, even assuming Mr.

Hoagland's alleged statement that he would stand behind his
product and "make it right" were the type of statement which
could be actionable, Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence
in the record which would show that Mr. Hoagland did not intend
to "stand behind his product" at the time he made the statement.
The evidence which is in the record, in fact, and which was
brought to the attention of the trial court, actually shows the
opposite.
Deposition testimony of Mr. Maack and Mr. Hoagland's
Affidavit established the undisputed fact that Resource Design
did subsequently attempt and undertake repair and remodeling work
at the Maacks' residence. R. at 1509-1510 and 1515. The
following deposition testimony of Mr. Maack was presented to the
trial court:
Q
You believe [Mr. Hoagland] tried to fix it, don,t
you?
A.
There is no question that he went up there and he
spent some time attempting to fix it, but he selected
the least expensive ways to do things . . . .
R. at 1509-10.

There is absolutely no evidence in the record

that, at the time of the alleged misrepresentation, Mr. Hoagland
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and Resource Design did not intend to "stand behind their product
and make it right."
Thus, Maacks' intentional and or negligent misrepresentation
claims failed for lack of any evidence of a misrepresentation of
material fact or of a promise, made by one not intending to
perform.

This deficiency, however, was not the only one

supporting summary judgment on these claims.
Maacks also failed to present any evidence of the required
element of reliance damages.

See, Price-Orem, 713 P.2d 55, 59;

Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981).

Maacks now

argue that Mr. Hoagland,s alleged statement was a tortious
misrepresentation or "fraud" not only because Resource Design did
not "properly perform repairs" after promising to do so, but also
because the statement constituted a promise that the work would
be done at no cost to Maacks and Resource Design subsequently
charged plaintiffs for the work.

Maacks' Brief, pp. 32-34.

Maack/s argument consists of nothing more than conclusory
allegations that they:
were damaged by their delay in hiring a competent
contractor to repair the defective work, by
accommodating Hoagland's schedule and allowing him to
do the remedial work around other projects, something
they would not have to tolerate if they were paying for
the repair work, and by having to defend against a
frivolous Counterclaim.
Maacks' Brief, pp. 33-34.

The Maacks, however, presented no

evidence to the trial court that they delayed in hiring a
"competent contractor" because of Mr. Hoagland's statement.
also presented no evidence that the alleged delay caused any
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They

additional damage to the Maacks.*' See, R. at 1970-75, 1985-88.
In fact, there is no evidence in the record that the Maacks would
have hired a different contractor if Mr. Hoagland had
specifically told them they would have to pay for any work they
requested.
Maacks continue to ignore the fact that they cannot say they
have been damaged by relying on Resource Design's work being free
because it was undisputed that they failed and refused to pay
Resource Design anything for the work done!

See, Robert Maack

Depo., (R. at 1504-05); Hoagland Aff., 5 9 (R. at 1513-15).
Their argument with respect to the Counterclaim, is one that
should have been directed toward defense of the Counterclaim.27
It does not establish reliance damage.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Maacks failed to
establish the elements of a claim for negligent or intentional
misrepresentation as a matter of law.—7

-7 Maack's allegations of the severity of defects as well as the existence
of delay damages are doubtful, at best. The undisputed evidence was that even
after Resource Design ceased all work for the Maacks, the Maacks waited
another year and a half years before hiring another contractor. R. at 1515 and
1511. Maacks, moreover, have lived in the house continuously since they
purchased it in 1988.
- Resource Design's Counterclaim survived Maack's Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment, but was subsequently voluntarily dismissed. R. at 2286 and
2219.
— 7 As discussed under the following point, the trial court also ruled that
Maacks failed to exercise reasonable, ordinary diligence. This is a further
basis for granting summary judgment on the misrepresentation claims. See,
Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141, n. 9 (Utah App. 1992).
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POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISHED MAACKS' LACK OF
DUE DILIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In its Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order Granting
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs, the
trial court listed material facts to which it found there was no
genuine dispute and then listed its conclusions of law based on
those facts. R. at 2212-17 (included as Ex. E in Addendum to
Maacks' Brief).

The following was among the court's conclusions:

Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy or written
evidence of a "builders warranty," their failure to
condition their offer to purchase the Home on the
existence of a "builders warranty" or on the receipt of
an acceptable inspection report, especially in light of
Robert Maack's professional training, clearly shows,
and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise, that
plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable
diligence.
R. at 2216-17. Maacks never objected to this conclusion.

R. at

2166-68, 2189-90.
The court's conclusion was fully supported by undisputed
facts in the record.

Even now, Maacks fail to dispute the

material facts set forth in the Rule 52 Statement.
Brief pp. 34-36.

See, Maacks'

In fact, Maacks again have failed to cite to

any evidence in the record supporting their argument.
In addition, Maacks seem to misperceive the district court's
ruling.

The court never ruled that Mr. Maack's negligence was in

excess of 50%. That issue was not raised below by the parties or
decided by the district court.

What the court concluded was

that, based on the undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise
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reasonable ordinary diligence.

This constituted further legal

basis for entering judgment against Maacks on their
misrepresentation and fraud claims pled against Resource Design,
Mr. Hoagland, and Dr. Jarvik.
The undisputed facts of this case are virtually identical to
those of the recent case Klas v. Vanwagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah
App. 1992) (cert, denied).

In that case the plaintiffs, attorney

Mark Van Wagoner and his wife sought rescission of a real estate
purchase agreement based on allegations of misrepresentation and
fraud regarding the appraised value of the property.

The Court

of Appeals stated:
[W]e find it unreasonable, especially given Mark Van
Wagoner7s professional training and experience in real
estate law, for defendants to have failed to obtain an
independent appraisal prior to executing the Agreement,
or to have conditioned the obligation to purchase on
the property appraising at a particular level, if they
were truly concerned about the property's appraised
value. Because the defendants failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation of the subject property's
market value prior to executing the Agreement,
defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of
ordinary diligence . . . .
[emphasis added.] 829 P.2d at 140-41.
on to conclude:

The Court of Appeals went

In light of our determination that defendants7 conduct
did not rise to the level of ordinary diligence, it
follows that the trial court correctly dismissed
defendants' counterclaim for fraud and
misrepresentation.
829 P.2d at 141, n. 9.
Just as in Klas, Maack, an experienced attorney, and his
wife purchased the house "as is." Agreement (included as Ex. H in
Addendum to Maacks7 Brief) R. at 1540-43. They failed to have an
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inspection done or to condition the purchase upon an inspection
or any written warranty.

See, Id.

They claimed vague oral

representations regarding a "builders warranty" of unknown
duration or scope, but expressly disavowed any such
representations or warranties in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement.

Id.

Incredibly, Maacks paid the asking price of

$595,000 without even attempting to have a professional
inspection of relatively negligible cost performed.
R. at 1540-43.

R. at 2452;

They admit that none of the alleged defects were

latent and they would have incurred no damages if they had merely
had the house inspected prior to committing to the purchase. R.
at 1761; Maacks' Brief, pp. 10-11.
In short, Maacks acted carelessly and now seek to have
others pay the price.

The court's conclusion that Maacks' failed

to exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence is supported by the
undisputed facts and should not be disturbed.
POINT VII
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS
IS NOT APPEALABLE.
On February 11, 1992, Maacks filed a Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment on the first claim for relief (breach of
contract) asserted in Resource Design's Counterclaim.
1121.

R. at

Resource Design subsequently filed a Memorandum In

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
together with a supporting affidavit and exhibits.
27.

R. at 1309-

A hearing was held on April 8, 1992, at which the Court
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concluded material issues of fact were in dispute, precluding
partial summary judgment. R. at 2286.
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland filed their Motion For
Summary Judgment on all of plaintiffs/ claims on or about March
25, 1992.

R. at 1428. After oral argument on May 6 and 7, 1992,

the Court granted summary judgment on all of the Maacks/ claims.
R. at 2081, 2147 and 2222.

Defendant Resource Design then

voluntarily dismissed its Counterclaim on June 17, 1992. 2219;
See, Order and Judgment of Dismissal, included in the Addendum to
this Brief as Ex. "B". Maacks did not object to dismissal of the
counterclaim in any way. R. at 2208.
"Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid
advisory opinions, [Utah appellate courts will] not generally
consider mooted questions on appeal."

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788

P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Merhish v. H.A. Folsom &
Assoc.s. 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982); State v. Stromauist, 639
P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981); Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 242
(Utah 1980)).
The function of appellate courts, like that of courts
generally, is not to give opinions on merely abstract
or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual
controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some
party to the litigation, and it has been held that
questions or cases which have become moot or academic
are not a proper subject to review.
Reynolds. 788 P.2d at 1045 (citing McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d
1190, 1191 (Utah 1974)).
Maacks have conveniently failed to inform this Court of the
fact that Resource Design's Counterclaim was dismissed in its
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entirety pursuant to the trial court's Order and Judgment of
Dismissal of June 17, 1992.

It was omitted from "The Nature of

the Case and Proceedings" section of their Brief (pp. 3-5

and

from the Addendum.
The question of whether the trial court properly denied
Maacks' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on one of the claims
for relief in Resource Design's Counterclaim is clearly moot.
Because the Counterclaim was dismissed by the trial court, there
are no "actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights" of
the Maacks with respect to any part of the Counterclaim.
Only where there are related issues of particular public
interest, or other extraordinary circumstances constituting an
exception to the mootness doctrine, will a moot issue be reviewed
on appeal. Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219,
1222 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896,
899 (Utah 1981); and Reynolds, 788 P.2d at 1045).

Maacks have

not and cannot raise any issues of public interest or
extraordinary circumstances which would justify review of this
clearly moot issue.

Their appeal of the trial court's denial of

Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the
Counterclaim should accordingly be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the
district Court,s dismissal of Maacks' implied warranty claim and
Suinmary Judgment on all remaining claims in favor of Resource
Design and Mr. Hoagland.
DATED this s/o

day of December, 1992.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
By
KURT M. FKANKENBURO
Attorneys for Defendant^
Appellees Resource Design &
Construction, Inc. and
Timothy Hoagland
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First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555

Ir

:T

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and
JUDITH D. MAACK,
Plaintiffs,
vs,
RESOURCE DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah corporation and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.
RESOURCE DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, INC. a Utah
corporation, and TIMOTHY
HOAGLAND, an individual,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.,

Civil No. 900903201CV
Judge Pat B. Brian

Third-Party Defendant.
Defendants.
The plaintiffs, for cause of action, complain and allege
as follows:

000304

»

1.

Plaintiffs are purchasers of a certain parcel of

real property situated at 4326 White Way, Salt Lake City
Lake

County,

State

of

Utah,

hereinafter

the

Salt

"S jject

Property."
2.

The defendant Resource Design and Construct- n Inc.,

i

is a Utah corporation, fully licensed and authorized to do
i

' business in the State of Utah.
!
Ij

j

3.

The defendant, Timothy Hoagland, an individual, is

a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
I

4.

Jurisdiction obtains and venue is properly laid in

,, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State
I of Utah.
i

I

z

;!

-

j

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

t

Negligence

j
5.
The defendants, Resource Design and Construction
M Inc. and Timothy Hoagland, contracted to build and construct
t j

il a residential building on the Subject Property.
i|

6.

The defendants, and each of them, were negligent in

' the design and construction of the subject residence rendering
>! the subject building defective.
11

7.

The defendants, and each of them, failed to complete

• i
i

, the construction
and
I
workmanlike manner.

building

in

a

satisfactory

and

i

- 2 -
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8,

The defendants, and each of them, failed to warn of

defects in the design of the residential building on the
Subject Property.
9.
design,

By reason of the negligence and failure to properly
supervise,

construction

of

construct,

the

subject

defective;

the

costs

Plaintiffs

are

also

of

warn,

building,

repair

damaged

and

in

could
the

the

inspect

the

property

exceed

is

$250,000.

diminished

use

and

enjoyment of their home.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as is hereinafter more
specifically set forth in plaintiffs prayer for relief.
II.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Strict Liability
i

10.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference

[ each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 9
i supra.
i

|
}

11.

The defendants have constructed a building (i.e.

personal residence) that is defective both in its component

J parts and in its entirety.

The defects include, but are not

• limited to the following:
1.

Membranes:
(1)

The

waterproof

membranes

that

were

installed under the roof, decks, parapets and flat
- 3 i

i

!
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surfaces were and are defective in that they are
not impervious to rain, water, snow or moisture
resulting in leakage and water damage inside of the
walls, ceilings and the interior of the home;
(2)

In the alternative, the membranes became

defective

due

to

improper

preparation

and

installation;
(3)

In

the

alternative,

the

materials

selected by defendants were not appropriate for the
use to which they were put and were installed in
contravention of the manufacturers instructions and
specifications rendering the membranes

defective

for the specific use.
2.

Stucco:
(1)

The

stucco

material

covering

on

the

exterior walls was and is defective in that it is
not impervious to rain, water, snow or moisture
resulting

in

leakage

into

the

interior

walls,

ceilings, windows, and into the interior of the
home itself;
(2)

In the alternative, the stucco materials

became defective due to improper preparation and
installation; or,

- 4 -
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I

(3)

j

The

defendants

(j

stucco

defective

materials
in

that

selected
they

were

by
not

appropriate for the use to which they were put and

11
j,
Jj
;i
';
h
ij
\
';
j1
,j

were
installed
in
contravention
of
the
manufacturer's instructions and specifications.
3.

Adhesives:
(1) The adhesive materials used to secure the

membranes and stucco materials in the structure
were defective in that they fail to possess the
requisite adhesive and cohesive values necessary to

I

properly secure the component materials;
(2)

In the alternative, the adhesives became

i
I

defective due to the improper installation; or

!

(3)

The adhesive materials selected by the

1}

defendants were not appropriate for the use to

Ifj!

which

il

contravention of the manufacturer's instructions
and specifications.
Due to the defects contained in the various

ii
il
|{
12.

they

were

put

and

were

installed

in

! i
]I

;j components of the structure, the entire building is rendered
ij
!| defective in that the structure is not waterproof or
!| weatherproof which results in water damage to the interior
'!

•I

'j walls and ceilings of the structure and to the contents of the
.! building
I

II

(i.e. carpets, furniture,

clothing, etc.).

In

- 5 -
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addition plaintiffs have been damaged in the diminished use
and enjoyment of their home.
13.

The defects referred to in paragraphs 11 a i 12 are

unreasonably dangerous.
14.

As a result of the unreasonably dangerous defects,

plaintiffs suffered damages consisting of the cost to repair
the

defects,

the

resulting

damage

they

caused,

and

the

diminished use of the Subject Property.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as hereinafter more
specifically set forth in plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief infra.
III.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Declaratory Judgment on Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur
15.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference

i each and every allegation contained paragraphs 1 through 14,
. supra.
16.

Pursuant to §§ 78-33-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated

and Rule 57 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiffs seek
declaratory relief; more specifically plaintiffs seek an order
of the court that the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur shall be
i

i applied at time of trial of this case.
17.

The case at bar is particularly appropriate for the

imposition of the Doctrine for the following reasons:
1.
That the defects are of a kind which, in the
- 6 -
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ordinary course of events, would not exist had due
care been observed;
i

2.

That the plaintiffs1 own use or operation of

the agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the defects, injury and damage;
3.

That the agency or instrumentality causing the

injury

was

under

the

exclusive

management

or

control of the defendants until it became sealed;
and
4.

It would require extensive destruction of the

residence

in order to ascertain the nature and

i

extent of the defects.
j

18.

Plaintiffs pray the court apply the Doctrine of Res

Ipsa Loquitur at time of trial.
j

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as hereinafter more

| specifically set forth in plaintiffs1 Prayer for Relief infra.
i
IV.
Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
19. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference
each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through
18, supra.
20.

Plaintiffs

have

been

injured

and

damaged

by

negligent and/or intentional misrepresentations of material

- 7 -

O0C3I0

facts made by the defendant Resource Design and its agent,
Timothy

Hoagland;

which

misrepresentations

are

more

specifically described as follows:
(1)

A Representation was made; (i.e. defendant Resource

Design and Timothy Hoagland acknowledged that there were
defects in the design and construction of the home which
rendered the building defective and in need of repair
including, but not limited to:

that the building leaked

water

the

into

the

interior

of

home

and

that

the

structure was not impervious to water. Defendants stated
that they would "stand behind their work and make it
right" and promised that they would correct the defects
in

order

that

the

home

would

be

completed

in

a

satisfactory and workmanlike manner, free from defects at
no cost to the plaintiffs.)
(2)
that

Concerning Presently Existing Material Facts: (i.e.
defendants

recognized

the

problems

in

the

construction, but stated that they intended to "stand
behind their work and make it right" and promised to
correct the defects at no cost to plaintiffs.)
(3)

Which was False:

(i.e. defendants did not stand

behind their work, correct the defects in materials,
construction

and workmanship, nor did

they

"make it

right" at no cost as promised.)

- 8 -
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(4)

Which the Representor Either:
(a)

Knew to be false:

intend

to

correct

(i.e. defendants did not

the

defects

at

no

cost

to

plaintiff); or in the alternative,
(b)

Defendants

made

the

promise

recklessly,

knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representations:

(i.e. when

defendants made the representation that the defects
in

the

structure

building
"made

would
right"

be
they

corrected
had

no

and

the

idea

how

extensive the defects were or the extent of the
cost and work involved; and, when the full extent
of the problem was realized, defendants repudiated
their promise.)
(5)

The Promise was Made for the Purpose of Inducing the

Other Party to Act Upon it:

(i.e. plaintiffs intended

that defendants rely upon their representation so that
defendants could attempt to repair the defects at minimum
costs and work; whereas, if plaintiffs had engaged the
services of another contractor, that contractor would
have been required to use first class workmanship and
materials throughout the repair, which would have cost
defendants more money in the event they were ultimately
held liable for the defects in the construction; further,

- 9 -
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defendants
forbear

intended

from

to and

filing

a

did

induce plaintiffs

lawsuit

and

to

establishing

plaintiffs' claims for damages by utilizing a competent
contractor to complete the necessary repair work.)
(6)

The Plaintiffs Acted Reasonably and in Ignorance of

the Falsity of Plaintiffs' Statements:

(i.e. plaintiffs

did not know and had no reason to believe that defendants
did not intend to fulfill their promise to correct all
defects in a satisfactory and workmanlike manner using
first

class

workmanship

and

plaintiffs1

consequently,

materials

belief

of

throughout;
defendants'

statements was not unreasonable under the circumstances.)
(7)

Plaintiffs

Promise:

(i.e.

did

in

Fact

plaintiffs

Rely

Upon

Defendants'

relied

upon

defendants'

promise to stand behind their work, "make it right" and
correct the defects in their forbearance from filing suit
against defendants and forbearance
services

of

competent

from engaging the

subcontractors

to perform

the

repair work; instead plaintiffs allowed the defendants to
undertake

the repairs and

remedial

work, select the

workmen, materials and method of repair.)
(8)

Plaintiffs Were Thereby Induced to Act:

(i.e. but

for defendants' promises and assurances, plaintiffs would
have filed suit in 1988 and engaged

the services of

- 10 -
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competent and experienced subcontractors and insisted
that the repairs be done using first class workmanship
and materials throughout all repair work; because of
defendants' promises, plaintiffs allowed the defendants
to select the workmen and materials and the method of
repair

which

ultimately

turned

out

to

be

shoddy,

defective and ineffective in correcting the defects.)
(9)

Plaintiffs Have Been Injured and Damaged: (i.e.

plaintiffs have been injured and damaged due to the fact
that the repairs were not properly performed resulting in
additional damages from water leakage to the interior and
exterior improvements and structure of the home that
would not have occurred if the work had been correctly
done the second time.

In addition, plaintiffs have

suffered 3 years of inconvenience and inability to use
and enjoy their home and are now incurring expense in
defending a counterclaim for the cost of performing the
work that was originally represented to be done at no
cost

to

the

plaintiffs.

By

reason

of

plaintiffs'

forbearance from suit and allowing defendants to attempt
the repairs, plaintiffs still have a defective structure
in need of repair and are now incurring

substantial

attorneys' fees in defending the counterclaim which would
not exist but for plaintiffs' forbearance.)

- 11 -
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21.

The above acts were malicious and/or were performed

and carried out with reckless indifference to the economic
consequences to the plaintiffs and said acts were done with
total

indifference

toward

the

injury

and

damage

o

the

property and loss to others thereby entitling plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages.
WHEREFORE,

the

plaintiffs

pray

judgment

against

the

defendants jointly and severally as follows:
V.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1.

Pursuant to plaintiffs1

First Claim

for Relief,

Negligence, plaintiffs pray the court enter judgment in their
favor and against the defendants for damages in an amount
equal to the costs of repairs and for the loss of use and
enjoyment

of

their

home

plus

damages

to

the

contents

commensurate with the evidence adduced at time of trial.
2.

Pursuant to plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief,

Strict Liability, that the court render judgment in their
favor and against the defendants in an amount equal to the
costs of repair of the structure plus damage to the contents
together

with

loss

of

use

and

enjoyment

of

their

home

commensurate with the evidence adduced at time of trial.
3.

Pursuant to plaintiffs1

Third Claim

for Relief,

Declaratory Judgment, that the court grant judgment in their
- 12 -
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favor and against the defendants invoking the Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur at time of trial.
4.

Pursuant to plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief,

Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation, that the court
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants in an amount commensurate with the evidence adduced
at time of trial together with an award of punitive damages in
the sum of $100,000.
5.

For such other and additional relief as the court

shall deem just necessary and appropriate in accordance with
Rule 54(c)(1) U.R.C.P.
DATED this 4th day of November, 1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Martin R.

Denney

lar\k A. Larsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, this 4th day of November, 1991 to:
K. M. Frankenburg, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
John B. Maycock, Esq.
John B. Maycock Law Offices
39 Post Office Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

FILES BiSYMCT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 7 1992
SALT LA^S COUNTY
By.

/\

Deputy Clerk

i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
MAACK,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual,
Defendants.

Civil No. 900903201CV
Hon. Pat B. Brian

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation,
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual.
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Third-Party Defendant.

Based upon the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal filed by
defendant Resource Design in this action, and good cause
appearing therefore, it is, hereby,

002219

ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED that all counterclaims of
defendant Resource Design asserted against plaintiffs in the
above-entitled action be, and the same hereby are, dismissed
without prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own costs
incurred herein.
DATED this

/

'T

r\

day of V - -

/s.sr*

1992.

BY THE COURT f)

HONORABLE PAT BT BRIAIT
Judge of the District Court

Approved as to Form:
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS

A. LARSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Robert D. Maack

3JD.

MICHAEL F. HEYRE
Attorney for Plaintiff
Judith Maack
(J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Mary C. W a r d e l l ,
by t h e l a w o f f i c e s

b e i n g d u l y sworn,

s a y s t h a t s h e i s employed

of W i l l i a m s & H u n t , a t t o r n e y s

Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiffs

herein;

for

t h a t she served the

a t t a c h e d ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Case No. 900903201CV, T h i r d
D i s t r i c t Court,

S a l t L a k e C o u n t y ) upon t h e p a r t i e s

listed

Judicial
below

by p l a c i n g t h e m i n a n e n v e l o p e a d d r e s s e d t o :
Robert K. J a r v i k , M.D. (Via F i r s t C l a s s M a i l )
124 West 6 0 t h S t r e e t
New York, New York 10023
Robert D. Maack
Mark A. L a r s e n ( V i a Hand D e l i v e r y )
Campbell, Maack & S e s s i o n s
One Utah C e n t e r , 1 3 t h F l o o r
201 South Main S t r e e t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Paul D. Newman ( V i a Hand D e l i v e r y )
SNELL & WILMER
A t t o r n e y s f o r Eagar & Company, I n c .
60 E. South Temple, S u i t e 800
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
M i c h a e l F. Heyrend ( V i a Hand D e l i v e r y )
C o u n s e l f o r J u d i t h Maack
310 E S t r e e t
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

and causing them to be delivered or mailed as indicated above on
the

day of June, 1992.

Mary C. Wardell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

day of June,

1992.
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
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